


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
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

No. 9

Selected Translations

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-- No 9

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1. Prospects for Developing the Coal Industry in the Ukraine in 1959-1965

This is a translation of an article written by G. V. Krasnikovskiy in *Ugol'naya Promyshlennost' Ukrayny i Perspektivy Yeye Razvitiya* (The Coal Industry of the Ukraine and Its Developmental Prospects), Kiev, 1959, pages 24-44.

The 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union outlined an extensive program of communist construction in our country for the next seven-year period (1959-1965). The target figures for the development of the national economy of the USSR during these seven years, as confirmed by the Congress, provide for increasing industrial output by approximately 80 percent and furthering the development of agriculture at a rapid pace.

The cardinal task of the Seven-Year Plan consists in ensuring another mighty upsurge in all branches of economy on the basis of the primacy of heavy industry, an intensification of the country's economic potential, and, on this basis, in achieving another substantial rise in the living standard of the nation.

The materialization of this program will be of decisive importance to the victory of the USSR in its peaceful economic competition with the capitalist countries.

The Seven-Year Plan provides for the preferential, preempting development of branches of heavy industry, and especially of industries which produce means of production.

Also great importance will be the development of the coal industry. During these seven years, coal extraction in the USSR should increase by 20-23 percent. In the Ukrainian SSR alone this [increase of] extraction will be somewhat greater -- 28.6 percent.

In 1965 the Ukraine will extract 211.1 million tons of coal, i. e., 47 millions more than in 1958.

As noted previously, the pace of increase in coal extraction in the Ukraine, in contrast to previous years, will be somewhat slower than the pace of development of the other branches of industry, which is attributable to the need for altering the structure of the types of fuel in the fuel balance, so as to reduce the consumption of the less economical ones.

Although the extraction of petroleum and gas will rise at a rapid pace, the further development of coal extraction remains a task of major importance; it demands intense effort

on the part of the workers of the Ukraine's coal industry to fulfil the targets of the Seven-Year Plan.

The demand of the national economy for fuel makes it necessary for the increment in the coal extraction in the Donbas [Donets Coal Basin] for the first three years of the seven-year period to be higher than in the remaining four years of that period. In the Ukrainian part of the Donbas in 1959-1961 this increment should amount to about 60 percent of the total increment for the seven-year period, and in 1961-1965, to about 40 percent.

In the Ukrainian part of the Donbas coal extraction in 1965 should climb to 189.6 million tons, i. e., increase by 40.3 million tons, in which connection the extraction of the most scarce grades of coal, assignable for coking, will amount to 75.5 million tons, i. e., 24.1 million tons more than in 1958 or 47 percent more compared with the over-all increment of 27 percent in coal extraction in the Basin.

Such a rise in the extraction of coking coals is suggested by the need for ensuring with coke the implementation of the expanded 1959-1965 program for the smelting of pig iron and steel. In addition, the coke-chemical industry will provide the country not only with metallurgical coke but also with a number of valuable products for the chemical industry, which in the forthcoming seven-year period will develop in the Ukraine at a very rapid pace.

The grade structure of the coals extracted in the Donbas will improve considerably. While in 1958 the share of sintering, gas and long-flaming coals in over-all extraction amounted to 54.3 percent, in 1965 it will rise to 64.0 percent and the share of lean coals and anthracites will drop from 45.7 to 36 percent. Such a quality structure will satisfy completely the need of the national economy for Donets coals.

Coal extraction in the new L'vov-volyn' Coal Basin will increase at a quick pace. Over the seven-year period it will rise from 1.9 to 9.7 million tons, i. e., fivefold.

All the 12 mines under construction in that Basin, with their aggregate annual capacity of 6.9 million tons, will be completed and activated by 1963. By 1965 these mines should reach their full planned capacity.

The extraction of brown coals in the Dnepr Region (Kirovogradskaya and Cherkasskaya oblasts) in 1959-1965 will remain on approximately the 1958 level.

The bulk of the brown coals extracted there (about 70 percent) will be briquetted. The amount of the briquetted coals will increase by one million tons in 1965. For this

purpose, two new briquetting plants -- Korostyshevskaya and Aleksandriyskaya -- will be built and activated.

The expansion of the output of briquetted brown coal will make it possible to improve considerably the supply of fuel for the population of the steppe regions of the Ukraine.

The unbriquetted Dnepr brown coal will be used only in the local thermal electric power stations adapted for burning this kind of fuel.

The Stanislav brown coals in the years 1959-1965 will be extracted on a scale satisfying the demand for such coals by the enterprises of the local industry -- mainly light industry -- in Stanislavskaya and Zakarpatskaya oblasts and by the Uzhgorod Electric Power Station.

The L'vov mines, which are currently extracting brown coal, are expected to be shut down toward 1962 because of their high extraction costs and their especially difficult mining-geological conditions.

The report of N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Congress of the CPSU "On the Target Figures for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR in the Years 1959-1965" states that "The workers of the coal industry are facing acutely the problem of the necessity of raising labor productivity and reducing coal extraction costs."

In this connection, the workers of the coal industry are yet to execute extensive and major labors to further the techniques of coal extraction.

The raising of the level of mechanization and the introduction of the recently designed machinery has made it possible to reduce the labor input required by a number of arduous coal-extracting operations which used to be done by hand. Nevertheless, the already attained achievements in the field of the mechanization of individual production processes in the mines have not as yet yielded a steep increase in the labor productivity of workers and a substantial improvement in the other technical-economic indexes. Labor productivity in the coal industry of the Ukraine is rising extremely slowly, and the coal extraction costs continue to be very high.

To eliminate these serious shortcomings, it is necessary, in addition to improving the utilization of the already available new technology, and better organization of production and labor in the mines, to solve the problems of overall mechanization in the coal industry.

No solution has as yet been achieved as to the mechanization of the operations involved in the manipulation of roofs and supports in the stopes, and hence over 30 percent

of stope workers are engaged in these operations and do them by hand. The attempts to design mechanized portable mine supports have not as yet been crowned with success; in this matter no perfect technical solutions exist.

No solution has been found as yet for the problems of the total mechanization of the tunneling of entries. It was only recently that the first experimental lot of cutting combines for tunneling through coal levels was released.

No tunneling combines have as yet been designed for burrowing through mine levels in high- and medium strength rocks.

The problems of the mechanization of operations on mine surfaces have not been completely resolved. The labor input of these operations remains exceptionally high. At present, approximately 25 percent of all mine workers are engaged in servicing the surfaces of the active mines. The personnel working on mine surfaces, as calculated per 1,000 tons of mean daily coal extraction, has increased by 25 percent in the Donbas, compared with the prewar level; this is approximately 40 percent more than in the mines of the Kuznetsk, Karaganda and Moscow-Area basins.

The problems of the automation of production are being resolved unsatisfactorily and extremely slowly. In the past few years the scientific-research and project-design institutes and the plants of the coal machine building industry have designed only certain technical means and schemes of automation. Moreover, the means of automation designed by them are far from perfect and they are not adapted for implementing the goals as to the automation of the machinery and mechanisms used in the coal industry. The automation schemes are complex, operationally unreliable, and require considerable expenditures for their introduction.

Moreover, these schemes can be applied, basically, only to stationary mechanisms -- main-ventilation fans, water-drainage installations, hoisting machinery and winches, which employ only a small percentage of mine workers. Therefore, they are hardly effective at all.

At the same time, the operations on mine surfaces, on underground transport and on auxiliary mine processes, which occupy a major percentage of mine workers -- as many as 35-40 percent -- still remained nearly completely unautomated.

The mines of the Ukraine have not as yet found a practical application for the new technology of the underground extraction of coal by the hydraulic method.

The other reasons for the low labor productivity and high coal extraction costs are such major shortcomings of

mining economy and on the surface of mines in the Donets Basin as the complexity of the schemes for the stripping and preparation of seams, the considerable dispersion of mine operations, and technological imperfections of mines.

In the Donbas over 60 percent of the currently operating mines were built in the prewar years, and many date from as far back as the pre-Revolutionary period. Therefore, their efficiency is seriously handicapped, and this has been further aggravated by the working of deeper seams in these mines during the postwar period. On the deeper seams of the mines there is more gas in the air, the manipulation of roofs and supports of mine passages is more complex, the temperature conditions deteriorate, the extent of supported passages lengthens, and mine ventilation becomes complicated.

The traffic volume of underground transport and the handling capacity of technological complexes on mine surfaces and of underground facilities are inadequate in very many mines.

The mean daily extraction per mine in the Ukrainian part of the Donets Basin is much lower than in the country's other coal basins. At present it is on the same level as in 1940 -- about 720 tons, whereas in the other basins of the Soviet Union it amounts to 1,500-2,000 tons.

As a result of the dispersion of mine operations, the mean daily extraction per seam, section, and stope is much lower than in the country's other coal basins.

Such a state of the mine facilities and the lag in the materialization of over-all mechanization and automation of production as well are inhibiting the growth of labor productivity in the Donets Basin, which anyway has not risen above its 1940 level.

What measures are being taken to eliminate these shortcomings?

The draft of the Long-Range Plan of Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR for the years 1959-1965 specifies that the principal trend in the further introduction of new technology in the coal industry will be the conduct of over-all mechanization and automation of fundamental production processes and the introduction of a new technology of coal extraction.

The loading of coal in stopes onto conveyors remains one of the most labor-consuming processes of coal extraction. Therefore, it is expected that the mechanization of coal loading in all inclined stopes will be basically completed during 1959-1965.

The extraction of coal by combines will be expanded,

mainly through the introduction, in 1959-1965, of new types of more powerful and improved machinery: combines with working organs adjustable to the thickness of a seam, shuttle-action combines, and special extracting combines making it possible to mechanize all stope operations as well.

The use of such combines will also make it possible to eliminate the existing shortcomings in the technology of coal extraction and in the organization of production processes, such as the inability to synchronize the principal processes of the hewing and loading of coal when using the currently available combines and the necessity of alternating these processes in a definite manner with other, more labor-consuming and completely unproductive operations such as the lowering of a combine into a stope, the disassembling and transport of a conveyer after each extraction cycle, the manipulation of supports, and others.

Such an alternation of operations of coal extraction with operations of stope preparations hampers the utilization of the readied front of mining operations, and it hampers a rise in labor productivity as well.

In recent years the coal industry of the Ukraine has commenced to work on the materialization of technological schemes ensuring the synchronization of the principal coal-cutting processes with stope-preparing operations. Thus, e. g., it has constructed and tested industrially the DU-1 narrow-reach extraction combines which make it possible to synchronize the coal-extracting operations in stopes with the transport of conveyers and the manipulation of supports.

The use of these combines in certain mines of the Donbas has raised labor productivity in the stope by 40-50 percent and reduced considerably the coal extraction costs. However, the design of these combines makes it possible to use them only in certain stopes with appropriate mining-geological conditions.

The DU-1 combines will be modernized, and new designs of special extracting assemblies will be devised as well. It is expected that 30 percent of all the existing stopes in sloping and inclined seams will be provided with such combines and assemblies by 1965.

As for the seams with a steep dip, the special machinery to be designed for them will include new types of extracting combines, coal saws, extraction shields, and other machines with a fundamentally new technology of coal extraction requiring no human presence in the stope. By the end of the Seven-Year Plan, 15 to 20 percent of all stopes with steep dip will be provided with such machinery. This will make it possible to double or triple the labor productivity

of the workers in such stopes and to reduce considerably the percentile share of extraction by hand hammers in the overall volume of extraction.

It is also expected that the mechanization of the tunneling of horizontal levels will be completed. For this purpose, during the seven-year period there will be designed new types of tunneling machines, combines for tunneling through hard rocks, and equipment for tunneling passages so as to leave rock in the mine.

The collection of rocks during the tunneling of inclined passages is not mechanized at present. In 1965 over one-half of the inclined passages will be tunneled by the mechanized method, while the passages with angles of inclination of not more than 20 degrees will all be tunneled by the mechanized method.

A radical overhauling of underground transport will be of decisive importance to a more efficient utilization of new technology in stoping and tunneling work. During the seven years, conveyers will be installed to replace the barely productive and technically imperfect systems of rope haulage on inclined mine shafts, main stopes, and gravity runways.

For this purpose it is necessary to devise heavy-duty belt and tray conveyers with a handling capacity of as much as 250-300 tons an hour. All inclined shafts and main slopes with angles of inclination exceeding 18 degrees will be equipped with special skip hoists. A number of mines intends to introduce the new and economically more efficient hydraulic form of the transport of coal and rocks.

Rail transport will be modernized: the capacity of mine cars and the power of electric locomotives will be increased, explosion-proof locomotives will be designed for haulage through mine passages with gas and dust hazard, bypass sidings will be built, and mine traffic systems will be greatly developed and improved.

In the current seven-year period extensive work will be directed toward the radical improvement of mine surfaces. In 325 mines, or 83 percent of all existing mines, total mechanization and automation of the haulage and exchange of cars in mine-surface buildings and mine-shaft yards will be carried out. Moreover, plans exist for the automation of 80 percent of skip hoists, 75 percent of main ventilating facilities, 80 percent of central water drainage pump facilities, and for the automation of operations on all rock dumps and mechanization of timber depots as well.

Work will be continued on the devising of multiple-

rope hoisting machines. The use of these machines will solve the problem of the hoisting of heights from considerable depths. Moreover, their installation in new mines will reduce the expenditures on construction and installation operations by approximately one to one and one-half million rubles per mine.

The stoping and mine-development operations will be based more broadly on the use of timber substitutes for supports and on the introduction of new types of supports.

The number of stopes shored up with metallic supports and other timber substitutes will be doubled by 1965; in stopes with inclined and sloping dips such supports will shore up as much as 80 percent of passages, and in slopes with a steep dip -- up to 25 percent of passages (at present only wooden supports are used in these stopes).

In 1965 the shoring up of entries with metallic supports, reinforced concrete frames and precast reinforced concrete supports will be increased to 90 percent of the total volume of supports in entries.

During the next two or three years new types of supports -- of metal and glass plastics -- will be designed for the stopes, including mechanized transferrable supports with hydraulic sections, and others. In the immediate future, improved versions of assemblable supports for entries will also be designed.

The broad use of timber substitutes for supports will make it possible to reduce in 1965 the consumption of timber per thousand tons of extracted coal by approximately 40-50 percent. Moreover, the state of mine passages will be improved and their maintenance costs will be reduced, the labor input required by the installation of supports will decrease, and labor safety will improve, especially in the stopes.

The projects for the 1959-1965 period envisage the industrial-scale introduction in the Donbas of the optimally productive and economical hydraulic method of coal extraction. For this purpose, the seven-year period will witness the construction and activation of a number of large coal and ore "hydro-mines" and the conversion to hydraulic extraction of several already existing mines and sectors after their appropriate reconstruction.

In the coal industry of the Ukraine one of the most important problems -- the transition to improved methods of working coal seams -- will be solved.

The currently employed continuous system of mining, which accounts for over 80 percent of all mining, was

formerly conducive to a rapid expansion of the front of stoping operations. Currently, however, the use of this system hampers the utilization of the available modern technology in stopes, complicates the operations of underground transport, and requires the conduct of extensive labor-consuming operations for shoring up mine passages.

In 1959-1965 emphasis will be placed on improved mining systems based on the working of stopes from the boundary of extraction sectors and mine fields. In 1965 the extraction of coal by these methods will account for approximately 60 percent of the total extraction of coal from stopes as compared with 18 percent in 1958.

On the seams with a steep dip, the next two years will witness an expansion of experimental activities purporting to introduce new mining systems which will make it possible to reduce the labor input of operations considerably and to curtail the consumption of shoring-up materials.

The materialization of the above measures regarding the design and introduction of new technology will make possible the transition, by 1965, from the mechanization of individual operations to the over-all mechanization and automation of production processes in stopes and entries and of operations with underground transport and on mine surfaces.

However, it is necessary to note and to stress particularly that in the Donbas the introduction of new highly productive technology is technically difficult to realize and economically only slightly effective, considering the extensive dispersion of local mining operations and transport. Therefore, a radical redevelopment and modernization of the existing mines are among the decisive conditions for a more effective utilization of the new technology and for a rise in labor productivity.

The problem of the overhauling of the economy of the Donets Basin mines had become ripe even before the war when, however, it was not solved. During the Reconstruction Period (1943-1946), when the acute need of the country's national economy for Donets coal had to be satisfied very rapidly, whereas redevelopment would have required a considerable volume of mine construction operations, which would have delayed the attainment of the above goal, a number of mines, especially the larger ones, were rebuilt according to the old, unmodified mining schemes.

In view of the concomitant lack of satisfactory technical solutions and equipment, underground transport and the technological complexes on mine surfaces had not been modernized and improved during that period.

It was only in 1952-1953 that the conduct of some work on the redevelopment of Donbas mines was initiated. However, inasmuch as this was done under the conditions of a very tightly stretched implementation of the plan of coal extraction, shortage of labor force and of material and financial resources, insufficient assignments of funds amounting to only 12-15 percent of the estimated annual operating costs, and their dispersion among many objects, the scope of this work was limited and scarcely effective. In the past four or five years may mines succeeded in eliminating a number of "bottlenecks," which were, of course, of great importance in increasing coal extraction, but which did not lead to any radical improvement of mining economy and mine surfaces.

For the purpose of expanding further the productive capacities of the existing mine facilities and creating the conditions for a swifter rise in labor productivity, the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers USSR adopted at the end of 1956 the decision to work out a multilateral project of the redevelopment and modernization of the existing Donbas mines.

Carrying out the decision, the engineers and technicians of the mines, trusts and combines of the Donets Basin and the project-design scientific-research and drafting institutes with the participation of the scientific workers of the higher educational institutions and academies of sciences Ukrainian SSR, have worked out the fundamental problems of the redevelopment and modernization of the mine facilities of the Donbas. This was fulfilled on taking account of the actual state of the mines, the pace-setting experience, and the newest achievements of domestic and foreign science and technology, and on posing, as well, the problem of finding such technical solutions as would make it possible to ensure a drastic upsurge in labor productivity and a considerable decrease in the extraction costs of coal, at minimal capital investments in mine modernization.

One of the root problems of the redevelopment of the mines of the Donets Basin is the enlargement of mines, thereby ensuring the concentration of production.

Soviet and foreign practice indicates that the highest labor productivity in the mining industry is, as a rule, reached in large mine, where the optimal conditions are created for an efficient emploment of up-to-date technology and newest production methods.

The output capacity of the redeveloped mines of the Donets Basin will considerably expanded, and large mines

with the centralized conduct of surface operations for several submines as a whole and, in certain cases with amalgamated underground operations as well, will be organized.

The plans for the redeveloped mines anticipate a steep increase in the intensity of the working of seams and levels by means of the maximum possible increase in the load per stope and per seam. In the Ukrainian part of the Donbas the mean daily load per seam in such mines will increase from 320 to 625 tons, and the extent of supported passages per 1,000 tons of daily extraction will shrink from 20.7 to 8.6 kilometers.

From the above-expounded fundamental postulates ensue the technical solutions of methods of stripping and mine development, methods of working the seams, and organization of under-ground transport, and other technological links of a mine.

The project-design institutes of the Ukrainian coal industry have already worked out the principal solutions for the over-all project for the redevelopment of the mining facilities of the Ukrainian Donbas.

According to the drafted project, of the total number of mines in the Donbas, which amounted to 555 as of 1 January 1959, with an aggregate output capacity of 155.6 million tons annually, in the next 12 or 14 years 146 mines with an aggregate output capacity of 22.7 million tons will have to be shut down either as a result of depletion of their industrially exploitable reserves or because of unprofitableness; 178 other mines with an aggregate output capacity of 55.2 million tons, mostly those constructed and activated in the last few years, will not be redeveloped, but will be subjected to modernization and further expansion; the remaining 231 mines with an aggregate output capacity of 77.7 million tons annually will be redeveloped. Thus, 50 percent of the mining facilities of the Donbas, in terms of its output capacity, and 42 percent in terms of its number of mines, will be redeveloped.

After the conduct of redevelopment in 231 mines, this number will diminish to 149, and their aggregate output capacity will increase to 114.9 million tons, i. e., by 48 percent, while the mean output capacity per redeveloped mine will climb from 336,000 tons to 770,000 tons annually, i. e., 2.3 times.

After the completion of the activities envisaged by the over-all project for the redevelopment of the existing mining facilities of the Donbas, the latter will be characterized by the following figures (not counting the new mines

to be activated from 1959 on): number of mines -- 327; their aggregate over-all output capacity -- 170 million tons annually; average output capacity per mine -- 520,000 tons (approximately 1.9 times as much as in 1958).

It should be kept in mind that the emphasis on the construction of large mines during the seven-year period and in the subsequent years will increase the average output capacity per active mine even further.

The decisions of the project for the redevelopment of mines can be illustrated by the example of the Mine imeni Stalin in the Luganskiy Sovnarkhoz. The operations of that mine will be merged with the operations on the adjacent mines -- Mines No 4 -- 2-bis "Irmino" of the Kadieugol' Trust and No 1 of the "Pervomayskugol'" Trust. After the conduct of the redevelopment the operations on the surface of the Mines No 4--2-bis "Irmino" and No 1 will be abolished. The projected output capacity of the merged mine after reconstruction will amount to 1,200,000 tons annually, instead of the present 1,070,000 tons annually for the three mines-to-be-merged as a whole. After redevelopment the mean labor productivity in the mine will rise to 42 tons monthly compared with the current 17.4 tons monthly in the three mines, i. e., 2.4 times, while the production costs per ton of coal will decrease by nearly one-half.

Characteristic in this respect also is the Central Sverdlovsk Mine of the Luganskiy Sovnarkhoz. After the merging if the mine fields of a group of mines (Nos 1.2 imeni Voykov, Nos 14-17, 1-2 and 3 imeni Sverdlov, Nos 13 and 23 imeni Kirov, and Nos 42--42-bis) and the construction of an amalgamated large mine based partly on already existing facilities, the aggregate output capacity will amount to three million tons annually.

The mean labor productivity of these mines, which at present amounts to 29.2 tons of coal monthly, will climb to 50 tons monthly. The conduct of the intended redevelopment will thus make it possible to increase coal extraction 1.7 times.

This emphatically illustrates the technical expediency and vital necessity of the redevelopment of the mining facilities of the Donets Basin for the purpose of their radical renovation and of the acceleration of technological progress in the coal industry.

The project estimates also demonstrate the economic effectiveness of this redevelopment. According to preliminary data, the capital expenditures on the over-all redevelopment of the existing mining facilities of the Donbas, not

considering the additional housing construction for ameliorating the living conditions of the workers, will amount to approximately 12.0 billion rubles.

The conduct of the redevelopment will make it possible not only to increase the projected output capacity of the redeveloped mines by more than 37 million tons (48 percent) but also to improve considerably the technical-economic indexes of their performance. Thus, labor productivity in the redeveloped mines will nearly double, and the extraction costs per ton of coal will decrease by more than 30 percent. The estimated yearly savings to be yielded by the decrease in coal extraction costs as a result of a drastic improvement in operating conditions, increase in the efficiency of utilization of new technology and rise in labor productivity will amount to 1.6 billion rubles. Consequently, the capital investments expended on mine redevelopment will be recouped within the comparatively brief period of about seven or eight years.

Moreover, it is to be considered that without the redevelopment and radical improvement of mining economy the continued exploitation of many Donets mines would become extraordinarily difficult, the economic indexes of operation would deteriorate further, and the output capacities of these mines would plummet considerably.

For the years 1959-1965 the draft of the long-range plan envisages the earmarking of substantial funds for the redevelopment of Donbas mines.

Within these seven years, the work on the redevelopment of 78 mines should be completed.

The organization of production and labor on mines will be essentially altered.

At present the majority of Ukrainian mines operate 359 days in the year; the discontinuous work week is practiced at only 25 percent of the active mines.

The operation of mines on a seven-day work week has made it possible to utilize more fully in the postwar years the existing capacities of the coal industry, and to satisfy the demand of the national economy for fuel and the demand of the metallurgical industry for coke.

However, the seven-day work week in the mines is not without major disadvantages: lack of time for the conduct of running repairs of equipment and mining passages, fluidity of the personnel of the work brigades employed in stopes and entries, absence of personal responsibility for the servicing of machinery and mechanisms, and the like.

As conducted in the past few years, the experiment

with the transition to a discontinuous work week on a number of Ukrainian mines has shown that in a majority of these mines the mean daily extraction increased and labor productivity rose, while the extraction costs per ton of coal decreased.

Previously the only obstacle to the conversion of all active mines to the discontinuous work week was the fact that not all of the mines possessed the reserve capacities of hoisting installations and underground transport necessary for this purpose.

Now such reserves will be created and, within the seven-year period, all mines will be converted to a discontinuous work week with a common single day off.

In addition to its positive effect on the rise in production indexes of mine performance and on the rise in labor productivity, such a work week provides better opportunities for satisfying the cultural and living needs of the workers, engineers and technicians, and their families.

Also the extent of auxiliary services in the mines will be reexamined. The personnel of auxiliary workers will be considerably trimmed by improving the organization of auxiliary and servicing operations and processes, combining certain occupations and introducing broadly "samoobsluzhivaniye" [self-service, or automation?].

One of the decisive conditions for increasing labor productivity is the intensification of operations in stopes and entries through the universal introduction and improvement of the cyclic organization of production.

Further improvements in the cyclic organization will be achieved by: shortening the duration of the production cycle through the mechanization and maximal synchronization of labor-consuming operations; increasing the number of production cycles per day; accelerating the feed rates of extracting and tunneling machines; and shortening the duration of the execution of auxiliary operations.

As a result of a broad introduction of the cyclic organization of production in the stopes, it will be possible to ensure, according to length of stope and the applied means of mechanization, the execution of one or two cycles daily when using wide-reach coal combines and two to four cycles when using narrow-reach combines.

The materialization of the intended measures for mechanization, introduction of new technology, reforms in mining economy, and organization of production and labor, will make it possible to raise the mean monthly stoping headway rate to 40 meters by 1965 compared with 30.2 meters in 1958.

The mean daily extraction of coal per stope will increase by an average of 30 percent in 1965 compared with 1958, and per mine -- by 36 percent (from 735 to 1,000 tons). This will make it possible to increase coal extraction in the active Donbas mines (not counting the new mines to be activated) by approximately 34-35 million tons in 1965, which, taking into account the shutdowns of the depleted and unprofitable mines, will ensure an additional increment in coal extraction on the scale of 12-13 million tons annually.

The execution of these measures will reduce considerably the labor input of operations in the coal industry. While at present there is an average of 1,107 workers per extracted 1,000 tons of coal daily, in 1965 this figure will be cut to 727 workers.

The labor productivity of the Donbas miners will rise by approximately 30 percent, and the extraction costs per ton of coal will decline by approximately 14-15 percent.

It is a very important task to improve the quality of coal. This has become particularly acute in connection with the exploitation of coal seams with high ash content in the postwar years.

In 1958 the ash content of the coal extracted in the Ukraine amounted to 18.3 percent, i. e., it was 4.4 percent higher than in 1940. By 1959 it will rise to 19 percent.

At the same time, the dressing of coal is at present the most backward branch of the coal industry. In the past few years the mechanical concentration of coal in the Donbas has hovered around a fixed low level of 42 percent.

To assure the national economy with high-grade fuel, in the years of the Seven-Year Plan the volume of coal dressing will increase 1.8 times, which will account for 60 percent of all extracted coal.

The output of graded fuel and coal briquets will increase considerably, and this will improve considerably the supplying of private consumers with fuel.

During this seven-year period the technology of coal dressing will be perfected. After the reconstruction of a number of dressing plants major emphasis will be placed on the method of concentration in heavy media, centrifuging, and other up-to-date dressing methods.

The workers of the coal industry will also have to solve many other important problems regarding the efficient utilization of coal.

Special attention should be devoted to the problem of expanding the raw material base of coking coals. At present, a number of scientific-research institutes have

completed work on projects providing a foundation for obtaining coke from poorly sintering long-flaming and gas coals. In the immediate future these projects will be subjected to industrial tests. If positive results are obtained, literally inexhaustible reserves could be utilized for the coke-chemical processing of coals.

To ensure the further development of the Ukrainian coal industry, the capital investments provided for that industry in the current seven-year period lie on a scale of 31.7 billion tons, or 17 percent more than was actually expended in the preceding seven years (1952-1958).

In the course of the seven-year period it is necessary to complete the construction of, and to activate, 66 new mines and pits with an aggregate output capacity of 48.7 million tons of coal; 64 of these mines should be activated in the years 1959-1962. Moreover, during the same period, the construction of another 38 mines with an aggregate capacity of 33.3 million tons of coal will commence in the high-grade coal sectors of the Donbas.

The development of coal extraction in the old coal-mining regions of the Donbas is to be accompanied by the mastering of new regions -- the Western and Southern Donbas.

The Western Donbas is particularly promising. That region contains 47 coal seams of worthwhile thickness. The coal is of high quality, with a low content of ash and sulfur, and suitable for coking. At present sectors suitable for the construction of 120 mines each, with an average output capacity of 200,000 tons annually, have already been explored.

Attaching special importance to the development of the Western Donbas, the government of the Ukrainian SSR has adopted the decision to establish there (in the city of Pavlograd, Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast) a special mine construction trust.

As distinguished from the practice of the past years, when capital investments in the coal industry were provided mainly for the construction of new mines, in 1959-1965 a major share of these investments will be assigned for the redevelopment of existing mines and dressing plants, further mechanization and automation of production processes, and measures to alleviate the working conditions of miners.

To implement this entire planned volume of capital construction, the periods of the building of new mines and redeveloping of existing ones will be shortened to three to five years, instead of the seven and more years in the past.

Such a reduction in the duration of construction will

be achieved primarily by introducing the over-all mechanization and industrialization of mine development and construction operations.

The plans envisage the use of improved methods of sinking shafts by means of tunneling combines and drilling rigs ensuring a complete mechanization of all shaft-sinking processes. The volume of the shaft sinkings based on the use of tunneling combines in 1959-1965 will total 19.5 kilometers, or 17 percent of the aggregate volume of shaft sinkings. During the seven-year period drilling rigs will be used to sink 21.0 kilometers of shafts or another 21.0 percent of the aggregate volume of shaft sinkings. Thus, it is planned to extend over-all mechanization to 40.5 percent of the aggregate volume of shaft sinkings. This will make it possible to shorten the periods of shaft sinking by an additional one-third or one-half.

Considering that the principal factor affecting the acceleration of the pace of mine construction is the introduction of industrial methods, the plans for 1959-1965 envisage a considerable expansion of the use of prefabricated structures and parts. In 1965 every million rubles of construction and installation operations will consume 230 cubic meters of precast reinforced concrete, or 2.4 times as much as in 1958.

The other planned measures pertain to promoting the further specialization and consolidation of construction and installation organizations, and also the establishment of integrated regional construction organizations.

A great deal of work will be done to further the development of mining science and engineering.

Plans exist for developing and testing new and more efficient systems of working coal seams based on the over-all mechanization and coordinated extraction of coal, and new methods of the manipulation of mine supports as well.

To curtail considerably the transport of rock from the mines onto the surface, improved methods and means of leaving the rock in the depleted spaces will be developed.

In addition to improvements in the technology of coal extraction by the mechanical methods, the plans envisage the continuance of scientific-research and design work on the hydraulic methods of coal extraction; development and testing of mining and entry-tunneling systems and methods in the Donbas; and the designing, on that basis, of new technical means for the extraction and transport of coal.

In the field of mine construction, emphasis will be placed on developing new technological schemes for the high-

speed working of mine passages, and projects for the organization of mine construction in shorter periods, as well as new effective and economical designs of supports for mine passages and ways and means of installing such supports.

In the field of improvements in electrical equipment and means of automation, the plans envisage the designing of explosion-proof mobile transformer substations with dry transformers, durable heavy-duty electric motors with improved mechanical features for activating the stoping machinery and mechanisms, starting-regulating, switching and protective equipment, and new types of flexible and incombustible cables with high mechanical and electrical strength, and diverse relays and automation equipment.

Analyses of the labor input required by the various operations of coal extraction and mine construction will be conducted, and this will serve as the basis for drafting concrete measures for a further improvement in the techniques, technology and organization of mine construction operations.

To improve labor safety and working conditions in the coal industry in 1959-1965, the plans provide for exploring effective ways of reducing air temperature in the stopes of the deep Donbas mines and designing industrial air conditioning installations for the mines.

The methods of the struggle against sudden eruptions of coal and gas will be perfected, and new and effective methods of controlling mine dust will be developed, as will be measures for providing warnings on and confirming the explosions of black coal dust in mines.

Plans exist for devising new, effective and safe types of explosives and blasting equipment, and for improving the designs of the existing instruments for inspecting the state of mine atmosphere and designing universal continuous action instruments for this purpose.

There is no doubt that, on broadly developing their creative initiative and utilizing even more satisfactorily the existing production potentials, the miners and mine builders of the Ukrainian SSR shall cope honorably with the fulfillment of the magnificent tasks stipulated by the 21st Party Congress for the new seven-year period, and shall make their own meritorious contribution to the cause of the building of communism in our country.

2. The Technical and Economic Council Attached to the Sovnarkhoz as a New Form of Public Participation in the Administration of the State

This is a translation of an article written by Ts. A. Yampol'skaya in Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo (Soviet State and Law), No 11, Nov 1959, pages 25-37.

...In recent years it [the "system of the dictatorship of the proletariat"] has been complemented by another new organizational form -- the technical and economic council under the sovnarkhoz.

The distinctiveness of this new form -- its special features -- is to be explained by its creation as a direct result of the reorganization of industrial management according to economic administrative rayons -- a reorganization that has improved the conditions for enlisting wide strata of society in active participation in the management of enterprises, if only because it has brought about a rapprochement between management and industry, and has transferred the center of gravity of the operative management of industry to the locale. It is natural that under such conditions the creation of yet another special organizational-legal form enabling the working masses to participate in the management of industry and construction should yield a signal effect. Therefore, the experience gained in the activities of the technical and economic councils merits serious and thorough attention.

The Sovnarkhoz Statute states that the technical and economic council is established for the purpose of safeguarding the participation of workers in the management of industry and construction, that it is to be established with the rights of a consultative body by the council of national economy ["sovnarkhoz"], which body is to be composed of scientists, specialists from the various branches of the national economy, and workers -- innovators and shock workers -- inventors, work rationalizers, and heads of Party, deliberative, economic, trade union, Komsomol, and other organizations.

Let us begin by examining the question of what foundations exist for classifying the technical and economic council among the collegial consultative organs/boards active under the organs of State Administration, and let us subsequently show that it occupies a special, independent place in that group.

The sphere of activity of a technical and economic council is restricted by the scope of activity of its local

sovnarkhoz, and by the sovnarkhoz's territorial boundaries. This restriction is to be construed in the sense that the technical and economic council is concerned only with the problems which its local sovnarkhoz is empowered to settle by decree (or by ordinance), because in the final analysis the decisions of the technical and economic council take shape in the form of legal acts of the sovnarkhoz. The technical and economic council [hereinafter referred to as the "council," unless otherwise noted] examines the principal problems of development of the industry under the jurisdiction of the sovnarkhoz -- problems of the development of science and engineering, pace-setting technology and organization of production, and their introduction in the enterprises and on the construction sites of the economic administrative rayon; the role of the council in the pre-term fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan and acceleration of technological progress is extensive. The Chairman of the Sverdlovskiy Sovnarkhoz S. A. Stepanov in his report at the June Plenum of the CC CPSU (1959) described, e. g., how the council in Sverdlovsk drafted a seven-year plan for the mechanization and automation of production processes on the basis of proposals from the collectives of the enterprises, construction sites and research institutes.* An analogous project was conducted by the councils attached to the Moscow Oblast Sovnarkhoz**, Tashkentskiy Sovnarkhoz, Sovnarkhoz of the Latvian SSR, etc.

The fundamental task of the council is the same as that of the sovnarkhoz, to wit: steady and rapid uplifting of the industry of the concerned economic rayon, upon a due consideration of the interests of the State as a whole. The council, as described in, e. g., the Statute adopted by Rostovskiy Sovnarkhoz, ensues from the need for the most rapid possible conversion into life of the directives of the Party and State concerning the development of industry and construction in the economic region. The same task faces the sovnarkhoz also. However, the council's approach to the solving of this task is different and based on other means, because the council is formed especially for the purpose of utilizing in the management of industry and construction the experience, knowledge and creative initiative of the wide strata of workers. This predetermines the distinctive

* Cf. "Izvestiya," 25 June 1959

**Cf. "Promyshlennno-Ekonomiceskaya Gazeta" [Industrial-Economic Gazette], 15 April 1959

features of this organizational-legal form.

Let us attempt to explain these distinctive features.

1) The council is established under a State organ (under the sovmarkhoz); the majority of its members are not sovmarkhoz workers, often not even workers of the organizations and enterprises subordinated to the sovmarkhoz; to be a member of the council is not to hold a State office but ~~to fulfill~~ a public duty. All this causes the council to resemble such forms of the participation of masses in State Administration as the permanent mass deliberative organizations active under the organs of State power and administration (commissions of the soviets of workers' deputies, street-block committees, etc.).

However, in contrast with the commissions of the soviets of workers' deputies, street-block committees, cooperation committees, etc., the council is not an auxiliary organ, i. e., it does not undertake the fulfillment of a part of the operative, current activities of the state organ nor require from its members that they carry out in practice the day-by-day activities of the sovmarkhoz; instead it is a consultative body. Consequently, the council cannot be classified among organizations of the type of commissions of the soviets, street-block committees, etc.

2. Nevertheless, the council is not a State organ in the proper meaning of that term, i. e., an organ exercising State power. This is not accidental, in our view. The Sovnarkhoz Statute does not call the council a State organ nor even a sovmarkhoz organ, and instead it specifies that the council is to be established "with the rights of a consultative body." True enough, there are features that cause the council to resemble an organ of State administration -- the procedure for formation of the council and the procedure for the confirmation of its statute. As is known, the council is established by an act of the sovmarkhoz such as is issued to establish the organs of State administration, institutions and organizations, subordinated to the sovmarkhoz. Moreover, the sovmarkhoz itself confirms the council's statute, just as it confirms the charters or regulations of its subordinate State enterprises, organizations and institutions. Therewith, however, ends the similarity between the council and a State organ, to wit, an organ of State administration. As for the differences, these are very essential.

While adjudicating the principal problems of the industrial development of its economic rayon, the council cannot independently promulgate its decisions on these problems, and it does not have authority over the organizations, enterprises, and institutions with whose activities it is concerned.

The decisions of the council do not have the character of governmental-legal acts until they are approved according to a proper procedure by a State organ -- the sovnarkhoz, or by a State official -- the chairman of the sovnarkhoz.* Prior to that approval the council's decisions remain in substance, recommendations, and in form juridical acts invoking a legal relationship between the council and the organ (or official) obligated to consider and approve (or reject, with an explanation) a given recommendation.

As distinguished from a State organ, called upon to exercise State administration, the council lacks a subordinate apparatus of functionaries. The scientific secretary of the council is a person belonging in the staff of the sovnarkhoz and subordinated in civil service grade to the superior officials of the sovnarkhoz. The necessary organizational-technical work relating to the council's activity is done by the sovnarkhoz's administrative apparatus. This is, as a rule, affirmed in all council statutes.**

3. The council is not a structural part of the administrative apparatus of the sovnarkhoz. For this purpose it would have been necessary for all members of the council to be in State service in the sovnarkhoz,*** and, moreover, to hold the precise position of Council Member. But such a position does not exist.

All this provides a foundation for classifying the council as an independent and special organizational-legal

* The question of precisely who (the sovnarkhoz or its chairman) is to approve the decisions of the council is resolved differently in different economic administrative rayons. But in all rayons such approval is mandatory.

** This is stated in, e. g., Article 5, Section IV, of the statute of the Technical and Economic Council of the Ul'yanovskiy Economic Administrative Region, approved by the appropriate sovnarkhoz on 16 September 1957; in Article 32 of the statute of the Technical and Economic Council of the Permskiy Economic Administrative Region, approved by the appropriate sovnarkhoz on 6 January 1958; and in Article 8 of the statute of the Technical and Economic Council of the Rostovskiy Economic Administrative Region, approved by the appropriate sovnarkhoz on 31 January 1958.

***Individual members of the council may be at the same time employees of the sovnarkhoz's apparatus, but this does not change their legal status as members of the council nor expand the scope of their service privileges, etc.

form of the participation of the masses in the administration, a form which is neither a State organ nor an auxiliary independent organization attached to a State organ.

The council is classified as one of the collegial consultative bodies /boards/ active under State organs. But in this group of bodies too it occupies a special and totally independent place. The council differs from the ministry boards in the trend and nature of its activities and in the organizational-legal rules on which it is based. The trend of the activities of the boards of the economic ministries is predetermined by a given individual branch (or several allied branches) of industry under the jurisdiction of a given ministry; the activities of the boards consist in examining the problems of practical everyday management, checking upon implementation /of instructions, etc./ selecting cadres, listening to the activity reports made by personally summoned representatives of the local organs of the ministry, dispatching representatives of the ministry for checking up on the implementation in situ, etc.*

The sphere of activities of the council is much broader than that: it is not restricted to a single branch of industry alone. The nature of the council's activities is also somewhat different. Instead of being concerned with the problems of practical everyday operations and organization of everyday management, the council is primarily concerned with the fundamental problems of the trends and prospects of the economic development of its economic administrative rayon. Pursuant to its statute, the council determines the technical and economic prospects for the further development of its economic rayon, and considers the principal problems of perfecting the organization of production and introducing industrially the newest technology, inventions and discoveries of domestic and even foreign science and technology.** As stated in the statute of the Technical and Economic Council Under the Sovnarkhoz of the

* Cf. Decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars and Central Committee of the VKP (b) /All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)/ "Concerning the Establishment of Boards Under the People's Commissariats USSR," dated 13 March 1938 ("Directives of the CPSU and Soviet State Concerning Economic Problems," Vol 2, Years 1929-1945, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1957, page 531

**Cf., e. g., Statute of the Technical and Economic Council of the Rostovskiy Economic Administrative Region, confirmed on 31 January 1958

Georgian SSR, confirmed on 28 February 1958, the purpose of the council is to stipulate the technical and economic paths of development of the sovnarkhoz's industry.

The attachment of a fundamental, State-wide importance to a consultative body active under an organ of State administration is a characteristic trait of the present stage of the development of the forms of the management of economy. This also ensues in certain organizational features of the council which distinguish it from the ministerial board.

A board is inherently an internal organ of a ministry: all members of the board are civil service functionaries in a given ministry. The membership of the board consists of the minister (board chairman), deputy ministers, and several leading workers of the ministry having the necessary experience (altogether not more than nine to 11 members).* To be a member of the board of a ministry is essentially to hold a position in the ministry's apparatus (there is no prohibition on a board member's being simultaneously the head of some structural subdivision in the ministry's apparatus), and an appropriate renumeration is tied to that position.

Nothing like this could be bound in a council, which is not an internal organ of a sovnarkhoz but an organ of the wide strata of the Soviet public, the embodiment of the experience, knowledge and creative initiative of that public. This predetermines the special position of the council within the group itself of the consultative bodies active under the organs of State control.

The councils differ also from the ministry councils which were retained in 1958, after the establishment of the boards, "as organs for contact with the locale and for exchange of experience."** The nature of the activities of these ministry councils was confined solely to the above-mentioned task, which had also predetermined the organizational features of their structure.

Compared with the ministry council, the technical and economic council has not only a firmer organizational shape, broader duties and privileges, but also closer organic everyday ties with the State organ under which it is active.

* Cf. Decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars and Central Committee of the VKP (b) "Concerning the Establishment of Boards Under the People's Commissariats USSR," dated 13 March 1938.

**Ibid.

All the foregoing raises the question whether there is any practical sense in clarifying such a seemingly narrow theoretical problem as the question of the place of the technical and economic council among the other organizational-legal forms of the participation of the masses in State administration? A study of the practice of the activities of such councils provides a definitely affirmative reply to this question. The clarification of the role of the councils in the system of various types of organizational-legal forms will assist in resolving correctly a large number of concrete practical questions pertaining to the legal position of the councils and, in this connection, their relations with the sovnarkhoz and with the State organizations subordinated to the sovnarkhoz; e. g., the question of the procedure for forming the council, the procedure for confirming its plans of activities, the procedure for converting its decisions into life, the control of the implementation of its decisions, the hierarchical order of responsibilities of council members, the nature of the guarantees creating the optimal conditions for a display of initiative by these members, and so forth.

Many of these questions are now being resolved differently in different administrative economic regions. In the majority of cases this is to be explained not by the specific characteristics of a given region but simply by the lack of the necessary theoretical clarity as to the place of the council, and its position among the various types of organizations. This obscurity exists also in the wording of the council statutes adopted in various economic administrative regions, in the formulation of the first few articles in these documents.

For instance, in Ul'yanovsk this document is called "Statute of the Technical and Economic Council of the Sovnarkhoz of the Ul'yanovskiy Economic Administrative Region," and Article 1 of that statute states that the council "is a consultative body under the sovnarkhoz."** In Kalinin it is called "Statute of the Technical and Economic Council under the Sovnarkhoz of the Kalininskiy Economic Administrative Region," and Article 1 of that statute states that the council "is an independent structural subdivision (?!) subdivision of what? -- Ts. Ya.) and has the right to act as a

*This statute was confirmed by the Sovnarkhoz of the Ul'yanovskiy Economic Administrative Region on 16 September 1957

consultative organ under the Sovnarkhoz of the Kalininskiy Economic Administrative Region."* In Perm' this document is called "Statute of the Technical and Economic Council of the Permskiy Sovnarkhoz," and it states that the council is formed by the sovnarkhoz and "is its consultative organ," i. e., "is an organ of the sovnarkhoz."** In Georgia this statute is called "Statute of the Technical and Economic Council under the Sovnarkhoz of the Georgian SSR," but the council itself is regarded as an "independent structural subdivision"*** (it is unclear as to what it is a subdivision of; obviously, a subdivision of the sovnarkhoz's apparatus -- Ts. Ya.).

Numerous instances can be cited as to the manner in which the resolving of the fundamental, principal question -- the question of just what a technical and economic council is -- affects the resolving of the subsequent, particular questions. For example, in Georgia, where obviously the council is regarded as a subdivision of the sovnarkhoz's apparatus, the council's plan of activities is approved not by the sovnarkhoz (board) but by the sovnarkhoz's chairman himself alone. In Tula this question is resolved differently: there the council is regarded as neither a structural subdivision of the sovnarkhoz nor a consultative organ under the sovnarkhoz's chairman, and therefore the council's plans of activities are approved neither by the sovnarkhoz's chairman nor even by the sovnarkhoz (board), but simply are adopted by the council itself without any submission for approval to anyone (the person serving as chairman of the council in Tula is the first deputy chairman of the sovnarkhoz, who is thus able to orient the council's activities in the necessary direction).

The differing interpretations of the nature of the technical and economic council as a definite organizational-legal form also affect the determination of the procedure for the approval and promulgation of the recommendations adopted by the council. As a result, in some rayons the recommendations of the council have to be approved by the sovnarkhoz's chairman or, upon his authorization, by the

*Statute confirmed by the Sovnarkhoz of the Kalininskiy Economic Administrative Region on 9 April 1958

**Statute confirmed by the Sovnarkhoz of the Permskiy Economic Administrative Region on 6 January 1958

***Statute confirmed by the Sovnarkhoz of the Georgian SSR on 28 February 1958

sovnarkhoz's deputy chairmen (e. g., in Tashkent and Rostov) in order to acquire the binding force of a legal act, while in other rayons they have to be approved by the sovnarkhoz itself (e. g., in Ul'yanovsk).

The resolving of these particular but important questions which essentially require no consideration of local conditions will be considerably simplified and unified if the nature of the council is clarified. It is for this purpose that we have undertaken this attempt at determining the place of the council among the various other types of organizations.

The foregoing should first be recapitulated briefly. The technical and economic council is a new organizational-legal form of the mobilization of masses in the State's management of industry and construction, and by its nature it constitutes an organ of the wide strata of the Soviet public with the rights of acting as a consultative body under a State organ; it is inseparably tied to the latter's activities by the scope of the problems with which it is concerned and by the organization of the enforcement of its decisions. Consequently, the council is neither a structural subdivision of the sovnarkhoz or its apparatus nor a State organ in the proper meaning of that word. Viewed from this standpoint, it is easy to resolve individual questions pertaining to the legal status of the council, its composition, the procedure for its formation, the procedure for the confirmation of its recommendations, the nature of the responsibility of its members, the internal organization of its activities, etc. Let us consider some of these questions.

* * *

The purpose of the technical and economic council and its character as an organ of the public predetermines the numerical extent of its membership and the procedure for its formation. For instance, in 1958, in Rostov the local council consisted of 281 persons; in Tula -- of 256 persons; and in Samarkand -- of 62 persons.

The membership of the council under the Sovnarkhoz of the Latvian SSR numbers 95 persons, of whom 39 are workers of the apparatus and subdivisions of that sovnarkhoz. In Tashkent, the council numbers 64 persons of whom 21 are workers of the sovnarkhoz's apparatus (chiefs or vice chiefs of branch administrations, etc.); the other members are: managing workers of plants and factories (16 persons), work innovators (seven persons), designers (three persons, scientific research workers (nine persons), and Party-Soviet

workers (eight persons). The council under the Penzenskiy Sovnarkhoz consists of 157 members of whom 94 are enterprise workers; 22 -- scientific-research workers from higher educational institutions, research and design institutes; 12 -- representatives of Soviet, Party and trade union organizations; and 29 -- workers of the sovnarkhoz's apparatus. That council's members include 14 candidates of sciences, 23 work innovators, and 106 highly skilled engineers and technicians.* Thus, in Penza the majority of the council's members is composed of enterprise representatives (engineers, technicians, work innovators), while the percentage of those coming from the sovnarkhoz's apparatus is comparatively low, at any rate much lower than in Tashkent. In this sense, the composition of the Penza technical and economic council can be regarded as more felicitous, because in it the locale, and the public, is more broadly represented. However, it should not be thought that a council's membership should lack any workers from the sovnarkhoz's apparatus at all. The most experienced and competent of such workers might prove to be very useful as council members. They are needed primarily to assure close ties between the activities of the council and the sovnarkhoz, to orient the thoughts and initiative of the entire council membership toward the consideration of the problems that are most actual to the industry of the economic administrative rayon as a whole, and to ensure a rapid, operative enforcement of the recommendations adopted by the council.

However, the majority of the council's members should doubtless consist not of the workers from the apparatus and administrations of the sovnarkhoz but of industrial shock workers, workers of science and engineering, and representatives of trade union, Party, and other organizations, i. e., the broad masses of activists. In practice this is what happens.

As is known, the composition of the council includes sections: in Perm' the local council statute provides for the organization of 13 such sections; in Rostov -- nine; in Penza -- 10; in Tula -- eight; in Samarkand -- three; in Tashkent -- seven; in Riga -- 24. The participants in the activities of the sections include not only council members but also other persons, enlisted in these activities solely in the capacity of section members. For instance, in Tashkent

*Cf. L. Terent'yev, "Penzenskiy Sovnarkhoz," Penza Publishing House, 1957, pages 23-24.

156 persons are active in the sections, but only 43 of them are simultaneously council members, the others being simply section members. An approximately identical composition of sections can be observed in the Tula, Chelyabinsk and many other councils. In Riga, where a single sovnarkhoz exists for an entire union republic, the composition of the sections is even broader. About 600 persons are active in the sections there, and of these only 95 persons are council members. When speaking of the breadth of the composition of a technical and economic council, it is necessary also to consider the activists working in the sections.

The procedure for the formation of the councils is also affected by their nature as organs of the public. Concerning this matter, the Sovnarkhoz Statute merely states that the technical and economic council is to be formed by the sovnarkhoz. As to the procedure for its formation, this is not regulated by the Statute. The sovnarkhozes have the right of deciding on this matter independently. And as a rule they decide it so as to reflect the democratic nature of that organ, its character as an organ of the public. For instance, in Penza the membership of the council includes persons recommended by the collectives of enterprises and by the public organizations of the city and oblast; in Perm' the council members are proposed by public and economic organizations subject to approval by the local sovnarkhoz; as for the composition of the sections, it is recommended by the council itself subject to approval by the sovnarkhoz. This has been affirmed in the Statute of the Technical and Economic Council of the Permskiy Sovnarkhoz.

It seems to us expedient to emulate such a procedure in the council statutes of the other economic administrative rayons.* In certain rayons, e. g., in the Rostovskiy, the composition of the sections is recommended by section heads subject to approval by the council chairman. The procedure adopted in Penza and Perm' is more commensurate with the very nature of the technical and economic council.

The consultative character of the council as an organ

*The editing of the corresponding articles in these statutes should be somewhat improved in comparison with the case of Perm'. The list of the organizations proposing council members could be expanded (in particular, by including scientific organizations), and instead of stating that the sovnarkhoz "appoints" council members it could be stated that it "approves" them.

of the public determines per se the juridical form of the acts of the council and the procedure for their realization.

At its plenums the council adopts decisions which could be classified into two basic groups according to their substance.

The first group pertains to decisions of an organizational nature. This includes decisions concerning the internal organization of the activities of the council itself, of its sections and its presidium, the establishment of official contacts with other public organizations, e. g., scientific-technical societies, and so forth. This first group includes, e. g., decisions adopted concerning reports of the council presidium or sections, decisions concerning the assignments given to individual council members or their groups, the formation of committees to work on such and such a matter, etc.

The decisions in the first group have a binding character, are addressed directly to the members or organs (presidium, sections) of the council, and are executed directly by them. For instance, in October 1957 the first organizational session of the plenum of the Technical and Economic Council under the Samarkandskiy Sovnarkhoz was convened. The agenda of the plenum included the question of the goals and approval of the plan of activities of the council and its sections for the fourth quarter of 1957, and the acceptance of that plan. Naturally, the decision on this matter was addressed to section members and bore a binding character.

The same group of decisions also includes those pertaining to the measures relating to the participation of the sovnarkhoz's apparatus and the organizations and enterprises subordinated to the sovnarkhoz in the drafting of problems to be submitted for examination to the council. These decisions are addressed not to council members but to the organs and officials subordinated to the sovnarkhoz; but, they also have a binding character. The right of the council to adopt such binding decisions with respect to persons and organs not subordinate thereto ensues from the obligation of the sovnarkhoz's apparatus and enterprises, scientific-research institutes, laboratories, design institutes, and other sovnarkhoz organizations to draft questions and prepare materials (reports, joint reports, conclusions, expertises, suggestions) for submission to the council, which obligation is stipulated (in this or other form) in nearly every statute of every council. For instance, Article 22 of the Statute of the Technical and Economic Council under the Kalininskiy Sovnarkhoz clearly stipulates the right of

the council "to assign to branch administrations, sovnarkhoz departments, and other sovnarkhoz organizations the drafting of the necessary data, reports, joint reports, and suggestions and the submission thereof to the section sessions."*

The second group of decisions of the council is inherently related to the sovnarkhoz's authority to control its subordinate enterprises and organizations, or the authority of the management of these enterprises and organizations themselves. Here the binding character of decisions would be out of place. It would have placed the council above the sovnarkhoz, converted it into an organ superior to the sovnarkhoz. Such a form of decisions would inherently have deprived the sovnarkhoz of the responsibility for the activities of its subordinate industry and imposed that responsibility on the technical and economic council. Considering that council's lack of legal powers of governmental nature in relation to the sovnarkhoz's apparatus and to the organs subordinate to the sovnarkhoz, this actually would have led to lack of responsibility, duplication, and chaos in activities. Therefore, the council's decisions pertaining to the powers of the sovnarkhoz with regard to subordinate enterprises and organizations and the respective authority of these enterprises and organizations are clothed in the form of recommendations.

Such a form of acts on decisions of this kind is provided for in the statutes of all technical and economic councils. For instance, in the Statute of the Technical and Economic Council of Pernskiy Sovnarkhoz, the Section on "Fundamental Purposes and Functions of the Technical and Economic Council" lists the problems to be examined by the council, on which the council is to provide recommendations. The perusal of that list convinces us that these are the fundamental matters under the authority of the sovnarkhoz: (a) yearly and long-range production plans for the development of industry in the oblast as a whole and in the individual branches of industry and enterprises, and the reports of the yearly activities of the sovnarkhoz and its individual administrations; (b) the over-all development of industry, on taking account of the prospects for the development

*Cf. also Point "a" of Article 12, Statute of the Technical and Economic Council of the Sovnarkhoz of the Georgian SSR, and Article 25, Statute of the Technical and Economic Council Under the Pernskiy Sovnarkhoz

of all branches of the national economy in the economic administrative rayon; (c) specialization of enterprises, establishment of new types of production, intra-rayon and inter-rayon cooperation, increase of labor productivity, improvement in the quality and reduction in prime costs of production; (d) introduction of new technology conducive to elevating the technical level of industry and construction, introduction of progressive techniques, devising of new and highly productive equipment and new types of production, and mechanization and automation of production processes. That list also specifies many other major matters under the authority of the sovnarkhoz on which the council is merely to provide recommendations.

An approximately identical gamut of problems to be considered by the council, and on which the council is to provide recommendations, is indicated in the council statutes confirmed by the Tashkents'kiy Sovnarkhoz, Sovnarkhoz of the Latvian SSR, and others.

This list is used as the pattern for drafting the agendas of the plenary sessions of the council and adopting recommendations. For instance, in Tashkent the local technical and economic council debated in 1957 the problem of "The Fundamental Trends in the Plan of Development of New Technology for 1958," and adopted a decision in which "for the purpose of eliminating the said shortcomings in the submitted Plan of Development of New Technology for 1958," it provided a number of concrete recommendations to the sovnarkhoz concerning the improvement and refining of the said Plan, and also recommended certain organizational measures. These measures included the convening of a conference of the chief engineers and technologists of enterprises for familiarizing them with the most advanced technological processes being employed in both domestic and foreign enterprises.

In Latvia in 1959 on the recommendation of the local council, a measure was undertaken which may be considered as a major stride on the path of technological progress. This concerns the broad utilization of radioactive isotopes in various branches of industry. In L'vov the recommendations of the local council regarding the development of new branches of the chemical industry were taken into account when compiling the draft of the local seven-year plan.

The recommendative form of decisions of the council does not at all signify juridical impotence of these decisions; it merely signifies a special procedure for the promulgation of these decisions. What is that procedure? The promulgation of the decisions of the council is effectuated by the decrees of the sovnarkhoz and by the ordinances of

the sovnarkhoz chairman and of his deputies heading the appropriate branches of industry. The problem is resolved in this way in Kalinin and in certain other economic administrative rayons. Such a solution is justified by the following considerations.

A technical and economic council is a consultative organ of the public attached to a sovnarkhoz. The gamut of problems considered by the council at its sessions concerns the fundamental problems under the authority of the sovnarkhoz as a collegial organ or, as happens more rarely, under the authority of the sovnarkhoz heads. It would be improper to legalize the recommendations on the matters under the authority of the sovnarkhoz itself (composite long-range planning of the industry of the economic rayon, plans for the introduction of new technology, etc.) by acts promulgated individually by the sovnarkhoz chairman or by his deputies. Here only a decree of the sovnarkhoz itself is acceptable.

On the other hand, the decisions of the council also include decisions pertaining to individual matters under the jurisdiction of the sovnarkhoz chairman or his deputies (certain aspects of the utilization of cadres, etc.). It would be improper to require that recommendations of this type should be mandatorily submitted for approval to the plenums of the sovnarkhoz. These recommendations could be realized more rapidly and operatively and quite legally (without infringing on the limits of the competences) by ordinances promulgated individually by the sovnarkhoz chairman or by his deputies.

Now let us consider the recommendations from the standpoint of their juridical nature -- let us clarify the question of whether they have a binding character and how this bindingness is to be construed.

A recommendation adopted by the technical and economic council constitutes, in our view, a definite juridical fact resulting in legal consequences in the form of a concrete legal relationship. Who are the parties to the relationship? It is not difficult to name one of the parties -- it is the council. On the other hand, an answer to the question of the identity of the other party may involve certain difficulties. After all, the recommendations of the plenums of the council pertain, regardless of the form in which they are given, sometimes to the authority of the sovnarkhoz itself and at other times to the authority of the organizations and enterprises subordinate to the sovnarkhoz. Who then is the party of the second part to the legal relationship?

Could a recommendation serve as the basis for the formation of a relationship between the council (its plenum)

and the head of a sovnarkhoz administration or the director of an enterprise? We can answer this question with the help of a correct comprehension of the nature of the council as a consultative organ of the public active under the sovnarkhoz.

Inasmuch as the council is an organ established under the sovnarkhoz, therefore its recommendations should in every case be examined by the sovnarkhoz (or in appropriate cases by the heads of the sovnarkhoz); consequently, a recommendation causes automatically, regardless of the identity of the addressee, a legal relationship between the council, on the one hand, and the sovnarkhoz, on the other. The sovnarkhoz is the party of the second part to the relationship.

Inasmuch as the council is a consultative organ and not a directly governing one, therefore its recommendations, if not approved pursuant to the proper procedure, do not legally obligate the organizations subordinate to the sovnarkhoz to consider them and to adopt the necessary measures. Of course, it can be visualized that a plant director who is present at a session of the council will, on regarding the recommendations pertaining to his authority to be reasonable and expedient, study them and implement them without first awaiting their appropriate processing by the sovnarkhoz. Such an initiative and operativeness could only be welcomed. Formally, however, the recommendations as a juridical fact does not cause a legal relationship between the council and the plant director.

The plant director is not obligated to consider the matters mentioned in the recommendation and to accept or reject them, nor is he obligated to act pursuant to the council provided in the recommendation, if the latter has not acquired the form of a decree or ordinance of the sovnarkhoz or if he has not received in the operative order a verbal directive from the sovnarkhoz heads for implementing the recommendation. The plant director is not liable to disciplinary reprimand for failing to consider or implement the recommendation as such.

As to the relationships arising on the basis of a recommendation between the council and the sovnarkhoz, they are totally different. They consist of three succeeding stages: (1) examination of the recommendation; (2) acceptance by the sovnarkhoz of the recommendation -- conversion of the recommendation of the council into a juridical act of the sovnarkhoz; and (3) conversion of the recommendation into life (realization of the recommendation).

Let us characterize each of these stages.
Examination of the Recommendation. A recommendation

adopted by the council ceases automatically and without delay a legal relationship between the council and the sovnarkhoz, the nature of that relationship consisting in: (a) the obligation of the sovnarkhoz (or in appropriate cases, of its heads) to examine the recommendation and to decide on it; (b) the right of the council to demand the examination of the recommendation.

The failure to examine the recommendation -- its disregard by the sovnarkhoz -- would be an abnormal and highly irregular phenomenon clashing with the democratic principles of the Soviet law and with the importance which in our State is attached to the public opinion. If, however, such a phenomenon should actually take place, then the council should address a complaint to the council of ministers of that union republic to which the sovnarkhoz is subordinated. The necessary measures will then be taken in reply to the complaint. All this ensues from the democratic principles of the Soviet law and State. However, it would be pertinent to specify by the standard legal procedure: (a) periods within which the sovnarkhoz should examine a recommendation of the council (so as to reduce these periods to their minimum); (b) authority of the council to submit complaints with respect to the failure to consider a recommendation within a legally stipulated period. This would be an important procedural guarantee of the efficacy of activities of the council.

Naturally, such legal standards should be established by an all-Union or republic act (by perhaps incorporating them during revisions and complementations of such an all-Union act as the Sovnarkhoz Statute). Their incorporation into the council statutes alone would be insufficient. After all, the council statutes are adopted by the sovnarkhozes themselves, whereas the standards in question regulate the obligations of the sovnarkhozes and the right to make complaints against sovnarkhozes. Consequently, such standards should be established by organs superior to the sovnarkhozes.

The Conversion of a Recommendation Into a Juridical Act of the Sovnarkhoz. The examination alone of a recommendation does not terminate the legal relationship between the council and the sovnarkhoz. Upon familiarizing itself with the contents of the recommendation, the sovnarkhoz (or in appropriate cases, its heads) is under the obligation of either adopting it upon confirming it by means of the appropriate procedure or rejecting it if weighty reasons for doing so exist. In the latter case the acknowledgment by the council of the sufficient weightiness of these reasons

will then end the matter. However, in the event that the members of the council do not find the reasons for the rejection of their recommendation to be sufficiently plausible, it is necessary to affirm their right to file complaints against the action of the sovnarkhoz (or of its heads). Complaints against decisions of the sovnarkhoz heads can be addressed to the sovnarkhoz plenum, while complaints against decisions of the sovnarkhoz plenum can be addressed to the relevant council of ministers. The right to file such complaints should be affirmed in republic or all-Union acts. Consequently, the rejection of a recommendation by the sovnarkhoz authorizes the technical and economic council to file a complaint against that action.

If, however, the recommendation of the council is apprived by the sovnarkhoz then it is, as a rule, clothed in the form of a juridical act of the sovnarkhoz (decrees of the sovnarkhoz plenum or ordinances of the sovnarkhoz heads -- the chairman and deputy chairmen). This does not terminate the legal relationship between the council and the sovnarkhoz, but it merely initiates the succeeding stage -- the stage of the conversion of the recommendation into life.

Sometimes the contents of a recommendation approved by the sovnarkhoz are such that there is no need for clothing it within a special legal act; in such cases the sovnarkhoz simply considers that recommendation in its everyday operative activities or when compiling a plan. In such cases also, the relationship between the sovnarkhoz and the council, having passed the stage of the conversion of the recommendation into an appropriate form, enters directly into the stage of the realization of the recommendation.

The Stage of the Conversion of the Recommendation Into Life (Its Realization). The functions of the technical and economic council do not end in achieving the promulgation of acts by the sovnarkhoz -- acts whose contents were suggested by the council's recommendations. The fact of the adoption of a recommendation (in the form of an act of the sovnarkhoz or an operative directive of sovnarkhoz heads addressed to the subordinate organizations and persons) places a new problem before the council -- the task of achieving the realization of the recommendation. For this purpose, the council is empowered to check the actual implementation of the acts or operative directives of the sovnarkhoz that are issued on the basis of the council's recommendations. At the given stage, this control of implementation constitutes the substance of the legal relationship between the sovnarkhoz and the council. The council's right

to control implementation should apply also in the organizations subordinate to the sovnarkhoz and to the sovmarkhoz's apparatus which are obligated to ensure the implementation of a given recommendation. The quality of performance of a council will be judged not according to the number of relevant recommendations that it makes but according to the practical effect yielded by these recommendations, the actual extent of the assistance which the council gives to the fulfillment of the plans of industrial development and the acceleration of technological progress.

To elevate the level of organizational work -- as appealed for by N. S. Khrushchev in his speech at the June Plenum of the CC CPSU (1959) -- means to realize the adopted decisions rapidly; operatively and thoroughly, to carry out a task to its end.

Such are the relationships arising on the basis of the recommendations of the technical and economic council.

We attach an extraordinary importance to a precise determination of the actual status of the technical and economic council and its legal situation at present. This is necessary in order to comprehend clearly the exact starting point and paths of the development of this organizational form, the future transformations to which it should be subjected, and the place which it will occupy in the universal movement along the path toward a communistic people's self-government.

END